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Sarah Kem ber and Joanna Zylinska 
Creative media: performance, invention, critique  
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Performing a new paradigm 
The discussion that folows ian atem pt to  enact a diferent m ode of doing critcal 
work in the arts and hum anites. Itadopts h e form at of a ‘live essay’, perform ed in (at 
least) wo voices, via num erous exchanges of  electronic traces, graphic m arks, face-to-
face uterances and corporeal gasps. This fo rm at isaim ed at faciltatng colaborative 
thinking and dialogic engagem e nt w ith ideas, concepts a nd m aterial objects at hand 
between the essay’s authors, or ather conve rsational partners. Our direct entry point 
into the discussion lies w ith what we are caling a ‘creative m edia project’. Itw il 
provide a focus for our broader considerat ion of issues of cross-disciplinary 
perform ance in this piece.  
 By giving a nam e to a set of concerns that have preoccupied us both for a long 
tim e, we are perform atively inaugurating this creat ive m edia project. The project arises 
out of our shared dissatisfac tion w ith the curent sate of the discipline of ‘m edia 
studies’ w ithin which, or ather on the m arg ins of which, we are both professionaly 
situated. In itsm ore orthodox incarnation as developed from  sociology, politcs and 
com m unications theory, m edia studi es typicaly ofers analyses  of m edia as objects ‘out 
there’ – radio, TV, the internet.  M obilsng the s erious cientifc apparatus of 
‘qualitative and quantiative m ethodologies’, it sudies the social, politcal n d 
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economic impact of these objects on allegedly separable entities such as ‘society’, ‘the 
individual’ and, more recently, ‘the globalised world’. What is, however, lacking from 
many such analyses is a second-level reflection on the complex processes of mediation 
that are instantiated as soon as the media scholar begins to think about conducting an 
analysis - and long before she switches on her TV or iPod.  
 What does our creative media project have to do with performance? Through 
instantiating this project, we are making a claim for the status of theory as theatre (there 
is an etymological link between the two, as Jackie Orr points out),
1 
or for the 
performativity of all theory - in media, arts and sciences; in written and spoken forms. 
We are also highlighting the ongoing possibilities of remediation across all media and 
all forms of communication. From this perspective, theatre does not take place – and 
never did - only ‘at the theatre’, just as literature was never confined just to the book or 
the pursuit of knowledge to the academy. What is particularly intriguing for us at the 
moment is the ever increasing possibility for the arts and sciences to perform each other, 
more often than not in different media contexts. Witness the theatre that involved the 
mediation of the Big Technoscience project in September 2008:  the experiment with 
the Large Hadron Collider at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN). 
The Hadron Collider is a particle accelerator used by physicists to study the smallest 
existing particles, and it promises to ‘revolutionise our understanding, from the 
minuscule world deep within atoms to the vastness of the Universe’ via the recreation of 
the conditions ‘just after the Big Bang’.
2
 Rarely, since the Greeks, has such an attempt 
to stage metaphysics been undertaken with an equal amount of pathos and comedy, with 
1 Jacquie Orr, Panic Diaries, (Durham, NC, 2006), p. 6. 
2 Quoted from the CERN website, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/LHC/LHC-en.html, accessed on 
4.10.2008. 
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satellite TV networks staging the event for the worldwide audiences in real time! 
Performances of this sort often incorporate their own metanarratives, or critiques – 
although these critiques tend to remain latent or unacknowledged. Remediating, via 
critical and creative intervention, such events, the creative media project we have in 
mind has the potential to become a new incarnation of the age-old ‘theatre-within-the 
theatre’ device, whose actors are also at the same time critics. 
 For Judith Butler, when drawing on Foucault’s work, the critic ‘has a double 
task, to show how knowledge and power work to constitute a more or less systematic 
way of ordering the world with its own “conditions of acceptability of a system,” but 
also “to follow the breaking points which indicate its emergence.” So not only is it 
necessary to isolate and identify the peculiar nexus of power and knowledge that gives 
rise to the field of intelligible things, but also to track the way in which that field meets 
its breaking point, the moments of its discontinuities, the sites where it fails to constitute 
the intelligibility for which it stands’.
3
 Taking seriously both the philosophical legacy of 
what the Kantian and Foucauldian tradition calls ‘critique’, and the transformative and 
interventionist energy of the creative arts, creative media can therefore perhaps be seen 
as one of the emergent paradigms at the interfaces of performance and performativity 
that this volume is trying to map out. What will hopefully emerge through this process 
of playful yet rigorous cross-disciplinary intervention will be a more dynamic, 
networked and engaged mode of working on and with ‘the media’, where critique is 
always already accompanied by the work of participation and invention.
4
  
3 Judith Butler, ‘What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue’, Transversal, online journal published 
by the European Institute for Progressive Cultural Politics, May (2001): non-pag. 
4
 In ‘What is Critique? Suspension and Recomposition in Textual and Social Machines’ Gerald Raunig 
argues that critique in the Kantian sense ‘remains an ars iudicandi, a technique of distinguishing. ... All of 
4
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Repetition with a difference 
One of the reasons for our interest in developing such a creative media project is our 
shared attempt to work through and reconcile, in a manner that would be satisfactory on 
both an intellectual and aesthetic level, our academic writing and our ‘creative practice’ 
(photography in Joanna’s case, fiction in Sarah’s). This effort has to do with more than 
just the usual anxieties associated with attempting to breach the ‘theory-practice’ divide 
and trying to negotiate the associated issues of rigour, skill, technical competence and 
aesthetic judgement any joint theory-practice initiative brings up. Working in and with 
creative media is for us first and foremost an epistemological question of how we can 
perform knowledge differently through a set of intellectual-creative practices that also 
‘produce things’. The nature of these ‘things’ - academic monographs, novels, 
photographs, video clips – is perhaps less significant (even though each one of these 
objects does matter in a distinctly singular way) than the overall process of producing 

these revisions of the existing original material are to be understood as a productive process of 
recomposition. Instead of introducing the distinction as an essentialist excavation of an origin, it is instead 
a matter of reinstituting a heterogenetic process: not a pure tree schema, at the head of which there is an 
original text and an auctor, but rather a much more winding practice of continual recombination. ... 
Critique is thus to be understood as an interplay between the suspended iudicium and inventio, between 
the capacity for judgment, which in “making understandable” clearly goes beyond the practice of 
empirically distinguishing in the sense of separation and exclusion, and the talent for invention that newly 
concatenates the (significant) components’. In: Transversal, online journal published by the European 
Institute for Progressive Cultural Politics, August (2008): non-pag. 
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‘knowledge as things’. In other words, creative media is for us a way of enacting 
knowledge about and of the media, by creating conditions for the emergence of such 
media. Of course, there is something rather difficult and hence also frustrating about 
this self-reflexive process, whereby it is supposed to produce the thing of which it 
speaks (creative media), while drawing on this very thing (creative media) as its source 
of inspiration – or, to put it in cybernetic terms, feedback.  
 But this circularity is precisely what is most exciting for us about the theory of 
performativity and the way it has made inroads into the arts and humanities over the last 
two decades. Drawing on the concept of performativity taken from J.L. Austin’s speech-
act theory as outlined in his How to Do Things with Words, thinkers such as Jacques 
Derrida and Judith Butler have extended the use of the term from being limited to only 
exceptional phrases that create an effect of which they speak (such as ‘I name this ship 
Queen Elizabeth’ or ‘I take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife’) to encapsulating 
the whole of language.
5
 In other words, any bit of language, any code, or any set of 
meaningful practices has the potential to enact effects in the world, something Butler 
has illustrated with her discussion of the fossilisation of gender roles and positions 
through their repeated and closely monitored performance. Performativity is an 
empowering concept, politically and artistically, because it not only explains how norms 
take place but also shows that change and invention are always possible. ‘Performative 
repetitions with a difference’ enable a gradual shift within the ideas, practices and 
values even when we are functioning within the most constraining and oppressive 
socio-cultural formations (we can cite the Stonewall riots of 1969, the emergence of the 
5 See J. L. Austin, J. L., How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, Mass, 1962); Judith Butler, Gender 
Trouble (New York and London, 1990); Judith Butler, Excitable Speech (New York and London, 1997); 
and Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Evanston, 1988). 
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discipline of performing arts, or the birth of the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1980 
as examples of such performative inventions). With this project, we are thus hoping to 
stage a new paradigm not only for doing media critique-as-media analysis but also for 
inventing (new) media. 
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Creative media: a manifesto of sorts 
Put boldly, our contention is that conventional forms of media analysis are ineffective in 
as far as they are based on what we perceive to be a set of false problems and false 
divisions. The false problems involve current conceptions of interactivity, convergence, 
determinism, constructionism, information and identity. False divisions, which continue 
to structure debates on new media in particular, include those between production and 
consumption, text and image, and language and materiality. We also maintain that there 
is no rigid division between new and old media, as ongoing processes of differentiation 
are constantly taking place across all media. The underlying problem of ‘the media’ is 
precisely that of mediation; of the processes - economic, cultural, social, technical, 
textual, psychological - through which a variety of media forms continue to develop in 
ways which are at times progressive and at times conservative. 
 The problem of mediation is for us both contextual and temporal. It centres on 
the evolution of media in a wider socio-economic context. The role of technology in this 
process of evolution is neither determining nor determined. Indeed, this role is never 
‘merely’ instrumental or anthropological, as Heidegger argues: it is rather vital and 
relational. If the essence of technology is inseparable from the essence of humanity, 
7

then there is no justification for positing humanism against technicism, or vice versa. 
There is also no point in fighting ‘against technology’. But there is every point – or, 
indeed, an ethico-political injunction - in exploring practices of differentiation at work 
in the current mediascape. Our creative media project seeks to promote the invention of 
different forms of engagement with media. This is not to say that differentiation is 
always welcome and beneficial, and that all forms of difference are to be equally 
desired, no matter what material and symbolic effects they generate.  Our emphasis is 
on creative/critical practices which are neither simply oppositional nor consensual, and 
which attempt, in Donna Haraway’s words, to ‘make a difference’ within processes of 
mediation. To put this another way, we are interested in staging interventions across 
conventional boundaries of theory and practice, art and commerce, science and the 
humanities. Such interventions may come to constitute events that cannot be determined 
a priori. 
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The invention of what (and what for)? 
Of course, not all events are equal, and not everything that ‘emerges’ is good, creative 
or even necessarily interesting. Far from it. Mediation, even if it is not owned, 
dominated or determined economically, is heavily influenced by economic forces and 
interests. This state of events has resulted in the degree of standardisation and 
homogenisation that we continue to see across the board: witness the regular 
‘inventions’ of new mobile phones or new forms of aesthetic surgery. The marketisation 
of creativity ends up with more and more (choice) of the same – even if some of these 
8
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‘inventions of the old’ can at times perhaps be put to singularly transformative uses. 
And yet most events and inventions are rather conservative or even predictable; they 
represent theatre-as-we-know-it. Our own investment lies in recognising and promoting 
‘theatre-as-it-could-be’ (the phrase is adapted from Chris Langton’s founding definition 
of artificial life, a discipline that manages both to draw on the most conventional 
metaphysical assumptions about science and life, and to open a network of entirely 
unpredictable possibilities for imagining ‘an otherwise world’).
6
 We are interested in 
witnessing or even enacting the creative diversification of events as a form of political 
intervention against this proliferation of difference-as-sameness. We find such ‘non-
creative’ diversification everywhere, including in the increasingly market-driven 
academy. One can easily blame ‘performance audits’ such as the Quality Assurance 
Agency’s inspection visits and the Research Assessment Exercise in the UK, or the 
compiling of international university league tables for the standardisation and 
homogenisation of the academic output worldwide. But these ‘quality-enhancement’ 
procedures are just a means to the end of competition and survival within an 
overcrowded global market, run on an apparently Darwinian basis whereby size (of 
institution) and volume (of output) really do matter.  
 In this kind of environment, it is sometimes very difficult to make a difference. 
But we can remind ourselves here of Haraway’s willingness to recognise the real 
limitations of a politics she referred to as cyborg politics. In that old, seemingly dated 
‘battle of the cyborgs’, she was always going to lose, but never going to concede: it’s 
like leaving ‘in the hands of hostile social formations the tools that we need to reinvent 
6 Christopher Langton, ‘Artificial Life’, in Margaret Boden (ed.) The Philosophy of Artificial Life 
(Oxford, 1996), pp. 39-94. 
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our lives’.
7
 Haraway’s cyborg politics may have been a feature of the cold-war (the old 
one, not the emerging one), but what survives of it is the politico-ethical injunction to 
intervene, to make a difference, not for the sake of difference but for the sake of a better 
– more just, more interesting - world. We take the ‘making’ in making a difference as 
seriously as the difference itself. Hence our insistence that theory takes the form of 
theatre; that it is always already performative, and hence our quest for the ‘invention of 
forms ever new’, to use Bergson’s term. These forms are hybrid, recombinant – and 
challenging. They represent the kind of conceptual risk-taking and creativity that Rosi 
Braidotti calls for in her book Metamorphoses, and that emerges from feminist 
philosophy in general. There comes a point, Braidotti insists, when it is no longer 
enough to deal with the breakdown of hierarchical conceptual dualisms just in the 
content, but not in the form of our address. As soon as we attempt to performatively 
engage form and content, reason and imagination, then we are faced with the 
controversial question of style which relates to the academic conventions of argument 
and presentation. Hence we are more than willing to join Braidotti when she says: ‘I do 
not support and assumption of the critical thinker as judge, moral arbiter or high-
priestess’.
8
 In consequence, an alteration in the traditional pact between the writer and 
her readers inevitably takes place: the ‘writer/reader binary couple is recombined’, 
Braidotti says, ‘and a new impersonal mode is required as a way of doing philosophy’.
9 
That is, a new impersonal mode beyond what Karen Barad might refer to as the ‘ethico-
epistem-ontological’ divisions between subject/ivity and object/ivity.
10 
7 Donna Haraway, Simians Cyborgs and Women (London, 1991), p. 8. 
8 Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses (Cambridge, 2002), p. 9. 
9 Ibid., p. 9. 
10 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway (Durham, NC, 2007). 
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 Sarah has been pursuing such an ‘impersonal mode’ in her attempts to write 
science and fiction in a way which fully recognises their mutual (re)mediation, as well 
as their existence as relational, non-self-identical differences in kind. Traditional literary 
fiction can be said to ‘other’ science by either avoiding it or subsuming it within 
familiar humanist narratives. Science-fiction, in turns, tends to fetishise (or demonise) 
what literary fiction elides. In so far as there are processes of othering at work in the 
attitude of science to fiction and, to an extent, of fiction to science,
 
then what exactly 
lies between them? The impersonal mode requires experimentation in form and content, 
and entails technical difficulties and problem-solving abilities on a surprising scale.
11
 
 
In 
terms of writing, the chief among these is precisely how to reconcile the exterior and 
interior world views normally associated with the sciences and arts respectively. 
Fiction, traditionally, offers a view of the world from the inside out, while scientific and 
academic writing would offer a view of the world from the outside in. In her 
experiments with writing across these two world views, Sarah is learning, the hard way, 
what it means to cross this tradition.  
 The Optical Effects of Lightning is a story, which could be a true story, about an 
experiment in human cloning and what it means to two narrators and to two brothers 
who are themselves year-twins (clones may be thought of as twins, separated in time). 
One narrator speaks in what Braidotti might call the ‘judgemental, moralizing high-
tone’ of someone who is, or considers himself to be, outside the experiment - 
commenting on it, reporting on it and on the protagonists involved. The other narrator 
11 This was brought home to Sarah, in a way which felt both companionable and inspiring, when she 
listened to Katie Mitchell discussing her work, Some Trace of Her, and when she watched, or rather 
attended the performance itself. 
11
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speaks of his involvement in the experiment, and of his experience, in a more 
conventionally fictional, or interior voice, which becomes increasingly obsessive and 
perhaps deluded. His less than likely, in-credible, highly subjective narrative is framed 
by the other more controlled, more rational and objective one, but we are never entirely 
sure which one is ‘true’. The story complicates this problem of truth when, like two 
cells in a cloning experiment, the narratives and their narrators are (literally?) fused. 
This attempt at (literary) sciencefiction plays on an analogy between the electrofusion of 
cells and the (optical) effects of lightning on the body.
12
 One of Sarah’s intentions here, 
or one of her interventions, so to speak, is to assert that scientific processes such as 
fusion are more than metaphors for fiction, or indeed, for theory. Instead, they become 
materialised and play a performative role within theory. This sort of intervention is 
therefore also something of an invention. 
12 The effects of lightning on the body are many and varied. They range from things like burns, 
concussion and heart failure that you might expect, to things like neurological damage and changes in 
personality that you might not expect. One of the ways that lightning can kill you prosaically (and it 
rarely does) is by means of a ground strike: the negatively charged lower portion of a passing cloud 
creates a positive charge in the ground underneath it, and this runs up one leg, through your body, and 
down the other leg. The effect on cattle can be particularly devastating on account of the fact that they 
have more legs. One of the ways in which lightning can alter you, physically, psychologically and rather 
mysteriously, is by using you, instead of a tree, to form an upward streamer – again the current passes up 
through you from the ground, and connects with the lightning strike descending from above. Sometimes 
reality is indeed stranger than fiction. When Sarah talked about lightning at a recent conference in which 
she was presenting and performing various aspects of her story, she encountered, for the first time, one of 
the non-intentional side-effects of pursuing an impersonal mode – a certain confusion of attendance. Was 
the science made up and the story really true? Ambiguity is one thing – and it seems totally appropriate to 
a subject such as cloning. Confusion, however, is perhaps a more problematic if productive affect to 
manage in the newly recombined writer/reader, speaker/audience relationship.  
12
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 To a certain extent, Sarah will be repeating this experiment in Media, Mars and 
Metamorphosis, a work of fiction which will appear to be, and which will (up to a 
point) be a work of non-fiction. Here, the narrator, Jeremy Hoyle, is an 
academic/cultural commentator and Fukuyama-like figure
13 
concerned with three life-
changing experiments in biotechnology. These experiments relate to different spatial 
realms, but are linked, in part, by their focus on the cell. They incorporate outer or 
cosmic space, the interior space of the computer and bodily space at the boundary 
between self and other. These different spaces thereby become analogous. The 
experiments - in bacteriology, immunology and mediology – include: one to test for the 
presence of microbial life on Mars, another designed to induce tolerance in face 
transplant surgery and a third, user-based experiment to test for prospects of intelligent 
media.  
 Three different characters, Lou, Hannah and Hal, talk about the life-changing 
experience of being involved in these experiments. Lou, an elderly and embittered 
microbiologist, whose previous claims to have discovered evidence of life on Mars have 
been repeatedly rejected by NASA, declares finally to have evidence of a Martian 
microbe with characteristics similar to that of green sulphur bacteria. Hannah, a neurotic 
young woman involved in a traumatic act of violence, claims to have had the first 
successful face transplant, based not on immunosuppressant drugs, but on the 
establishment of immune tolerance and hybridity between the donor and recipient. 
Finally, Hal, a middle-aged curmudgeonly technophobe with a drink habit, who agreed 
to take part in a smart home experiment because he needed the money, claims that 
13 Put bluntly, liberal-humanist, judgemental, moralising and conservative. 
13
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something ‘weird’ happened when the speech-based, adaptive and so-called ‘intelligent’ 
objects he was forced to interact with started to sound more and more like him.  
 Jeremy interviews each character and – understandably – doesn’t really believe 
them. Not only do these experiments, and others like them, cross the line of good 
science and the sanctity of human nature (as distinct from aliens, hybrids and cyborgs), 
they are more than likely to be hoaxes. However, his conclusion is somewhat 
complicated by his own subsequent experience. Jeremy starts to feel ill. Jeremy is not 
himself. He must have a terrible stomach bug or something because he is shitting green 
stuff and hallucinating – he doesn’t even recognise his own face in the mirror and 
what’s more, what’s worse, neither does the mirror. And it’s telling him so… 
 The point of these true stories - these ‘factions’ that stay as close as possible to 
what is happening in the world of technoscience now (not in the future) – is not to 
validate the humanist category of experience but rather to explore the possibilities of 
what Keith Ansell Pearson terms ‘experience enlarged and gone beyond’.
14
 That is, 
experience gone beyond anything singular, or dual, towards something potentially 
multiple and inherently non-experiential. The body, poor Jeremy’s body, enacts or 
performs this enlargement of experience – for us. We (writer and reader) attend his 
transformation, his metamorphosis in as far as we identify with his rigid and righteous 
refusal of it. It isn’t a nice trick to pull on him, Sarah’s substitute – the dramatised and 
somewhat parodied voice of the theorist. But perhaps it’s time we dealt with our alter-
egos, cancelled each other out as we are supposed to – at least in the Gothic literary 
tradition, if not in the academic one - and found a different mode of working and 
playing. 
14 Keith Ansell Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual (London and New York, 2002), p. 8. 
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Technology and the body 
Donna Haraway is an important figure for us in our joint work and play, because she 
was one of the first thinkers to offer a critical, insubordinate and playful engagement 
with technological processes within a wider socio-cultural setup. Even though her 
‘cyborg’, a Star Wars-era creature which hybridised flesh and metal, carbon and silicon, 
seems positively old-fashioned in the current era of biotechnological hybrids that can 
literally get under our skin (or into our digestive systems), the political significance of 
her intervention into what she termed ‘technoscience’ has not lost any of its validity. 
For any creative media project to be truly inventive, it needs to work through the 
ontological and epistemological consequences of technologies and media becoming 
increasingly closer to us. It also needs to consider what the French philosopher Bernard 
Stiegler calls our ‘originary technicity’,
15
 where technology is comprehended as an 
originary condition of our being in the world, not just an external object we all learn to 
manipulate for our advantage and benefit.  
 This is a very different view of technology and mediation from the one that sees 
the human as ‘natural’ and technology and media as external agents.  This view 
challenges the instrumental understanding of technology proposed by the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle, a framework which still shapes the majority of our media stories 
about IT, the internet or genetics. Within this instrumental framework, technology is 
15 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1 (Stanford, 1998). 
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seen as just a tool for the human. It is an external object that either promises us pleasure, 
if it is a gadget such as a digital camera, or threatens our life and well-being, if it is a 
bomb or a lethal injection. However, what we are trying to do with our alternative 
media paradigm is argue for the possibility of, and need for, adopting a different model 
– one proposed not only by Haraway and Stiegler but also by the Australian 
performance artist Stelarc. All these thinkers are very critical of the story of the human 
as a master of the universe who can become even more powerful via his media gadgets. 
Instead, they outline a more systemic and networked model of human-nonhuman 
relations, in which mediated prostheses are seen as intrinsic parts of the human body.  
 In an interview with Joanna for her 2002 book, The Cyborg Experiments: The 
Extensions of the Body in the Media Age, Stelarc explained his understanding of the 
relationship between technology and the human as follows: ‘[T]he body has always 
been a prosthetic body. Ever since we evolved as hominids and developed bipedal 
locomotion, two limbs became manipulators. We have become creatures that construct 
tools, artefacts and machines. We’ve always been augmented by our instruments, our 
technologies. Technology is what constructs our humanity; the trajectory of technology 
is what has propelled human developments. I’ve never seen the body as purely 
biological, so to consider technology as a kind of alien other that happens upon us at the 
end of the millennium is rather simplistic’.
16
 So clearly, we shouldn’t think that there 
was once a ‘pure’ body and that this has somehow been contaminated just as we entered 
the technological age. Instead, as Stelarc puts it, ‘We’ve been simultaneously zombies 
16 Gary Hall and Joanna Zylinska, ‘Probings: An Interview with Stelarc’, in Joanna Zylinska (ed.) The 
Cyborg Experiments (London and New York, 2002), p. 114.  
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and cyborgs; we’ve never really had a mind of our own and we’ve never been purely 
biological entities’.
17
 
 From this critical-cybernetic perspective, the human is seen as having always 
been technological, or having always been mediated. To put it differently, technology 
and media are precisely what makes us human. Even if we agree that the body is 
somewhat weakened or inadequate in a world of ubiquitous information flows, 
computer-led wars and nanotechnology, it does not mean we have to bemoan the loss of 
our human potency, or desire to become Terminator-like robots ourselves. We can 
better understand this position as a pragmatic recognition of our dependency on 
technical and media objects. The work of techno-artists such as Stelarc, or techno-
philosophers such as Stiegler and Haraway should not therefore be reduced to a naïve 
prophecy of a post-flesh world in which man will eventually overcome his 
technological limitations. Instead, we’re better off seeing it as an exploration of the 
symbiotic relationship the human has always had with technology and media. In other 
words, it shows us technology as being an inseparable part of both ‘the human’ and ‘the 
body’.  
 Why is it important for us to think of ourselves in this way? Well, for starters, 
this position allows for a better understanding of the relations and connections we have 
in the world. It also lets us develop a more interesting and more critical relationship to 
‘nature’ and ‘the environment’. If we do accept that we have indeed always been 
cyborgs, that we have always been mediated, it will be easier for us to let go of paranoid 
narratives (such as Jeremy’s from Sarah’s novel) which see technology as an external 
other that threatens the human, and that needs to be stopped at all cost before a new 
17 Ibid., p. 115. 
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mutant species – of replicants, robots, aliens - emerges to compete with humans and 
eventually to win the battle. All this is not to say that in the universe of complex 
relations between human and nonhuman beings ‘anything goes’, and that all 
connections are equally good. But seeing ourselves as always already connected, as 
being part of the system – rather than as kings of the universe to which all beings are 
inferior - is an important step in developing a more critical and a more responsible 
relationship to the world, to what we call ‘man’, ‘nature’ and ‘technology’. It is also a 
promise of the emergence of some more productive media relations and media 
environments. 
 Joanna has attempted to enact such a productive relation between technology 
and the human in her photographic work, in particular in her 2007 project titled We 
Have Always Been Digital. This has been a way for her to actually practice media 
philosophy, and to perform concepts via images. The project started with an attempt to 
think about the media, both ‘new’ and ‘old’, and the way culture repurposes and 
remediates its different media forms. It may seem constraining or even reductive to 
begin describing visual work with the verb ‘to think’. And yet, given her professional 
background in philosophy and media theory, this is the way of approaching creative 
media practice and visual culture she is most comfortable with, and one she is not ready 
to abandon altogether. To be interesting, creative practice, including photography, for 
her has to mobilise complex thought processes, although without doubt it should do 
more than just illustrate already worked-out ideas and concepts. The very nature of this 
‘more’ constitutes part of the invention process activated throughout this project. 
 Visual work can of course help us articulate concepts or states that exceed the 
linguistic, and achieve things that spoken and written language cannot do. But then 
written texts themselves always already entail a certain lack of determination: even the 
18
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tightest philosophical argument is always based on a leap of faith, and remains 
underpinned by numerous investments of which we can only be partly aware. This is a 
very round-about, perhaps defensive, way of saying that finding a satisfactory way of 
negotiating between visual and textual narratives is never going to be easy for a media 
theorist, and that she will not satisfied with just suspending the latter for the sake of the 
former.  
 
[insert Images 6-11, files 6.tiff-11.tiff – all landscape] 
Ideally, please display all 6 images on the same page; all in the same size, in 3 pairs 
(with 2 images in each pair combined seamlessly, with a small gap between the 3 pairs) 
– just as presented on the list of images enclosed. There is only one caption for all 6 
images. 
Joanna Zylinska, We Have Always Been Digital, 2007 
 
 
Joanna’s We Have Always Been Digital project explores digitality as the intrinsic 
condition of photography, both in its past and present forms. Rather than focus on the 
aesthetic qualities of light, it invites the viewer to consider the formal role of light in the 
constitution of a pattern, the ‘ON/OFF’ of the information culture. The project assumes 
that computation also takes place outside what we conventionally think of as 
‘computers’. Indeed, it is through the differential effect of the presence and absence of 
any data - of pattern, electricity, light - that computation occurs in the wider world, 
engendering complexity and bringing about change. The six images presented here 
show the digital flow and exchange of data in different media: house walls, furniture, 
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human bodies. They capture the digital condition: the emergence of a pattern of 0s and 
1s.  
 The project has had numerous inspirations, both textual and visual. It started 
with W. H. Fox Talbot’s ‘photogenic drawings’ of lace and of light falling through the 
window panels in Lacock Abbey – a set of images Talbot allegedly sent to his friend 
Charles Babbage, the inventor of the differential engine (the first computer). This story, 
hinting at the parallel invention of photography and computing as two ways of capturing 
the pattern in different media, has been narrated by Geoffery Batchen in his article 
‘Electricity Made Visible’. For Batchen, ‘photography is a binary (and therefore 
numerical) system of representation involving the transmutation of luminous 
information into on/off tonal patterns made visible by light-sensitive chemistry’.
18
 It is 
therefore a fledgling form of informational culture, one that since its inception records 
the presence and absence of data. The images that constitute We Have Always Been 
Digital have also been infused with some splinters of the theory of computational 
universe developed by the likes of Edward Fredkin, which assumes that all matter is 
computational, i.e. that it consists in the differentiation between present and absent bits 
of information.
19
 However, any straightforward applications of this theory as allegedly 
telling us ‘what the world is like’ are bound to be deeply problematic. The singular 
materiality of each photographic medium – be it camera, paper, computer screen or 
human body, from which the image is emitted and on which it is projected - destabilises 
the universalising seamlessness of Fredkin’s propositions.  
18 Geoffrey Batchen, ‘Electricity Made Visible’, in: Wendy Hui Kyong Chun and Thomas Keenan (eds) 
New Media, Old Media (New York and London, 2006), p. 28. 
19 For an interesting reading of Fredkin’s theories in the context of arts and humanities research see N. 
Katherine Hayles, My Mother Was a Computer (Chicago, 2005). 
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 It is precisely in the tension between the conceptual and technical ‘liquidity’ of 
the photographic object as such, and the (always temporary) solidity of its medium, that 
interesting creative possibilities are arguably opened up. The point of such creative 
experimentation with the photographic medium lies not so much in nostalgically 
harking back to older, more ‘solid’ media – be it analogue film or mechanical large-
format cameras - although sometimes these particular choices may present themselves 
to us as aesthetically better and more fitting. What is much more important, however, is 
not foreclosing the performative invention of photography, or any other medium – an 
invention which is always potentially ongoing, even if not always enacted – with ready-
made decisions about its effects and affects, aesthetic, ethical or political ones. 
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Ethical openings 
Even though human agency does not withdraw altogether from these processes of 
creative and critical invention, it is distributed throughout a system of forces, 
institutions, bodies and nodal points. This acknowledgement of agential distribution - a 
paradox that requires a temporarily stabilised self which is to undertake this realization 
– allows for an enactment of a more hospitable and more enmeshed relationship with 
technology and the media. This brings us to an interesting point made by Stelarc, who, 
when commenting on his performances, mentioned adopting ‘the posture of 
indifference’ in relation to them. This involves abandoning any desire to entirely control 
the event and allowing it to just unfold after starting it off. Stelarc’s pronouncement 
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conveys a tension between the modernist notion of artist as lone creator and instigator 
of ideas on the one hand, and the cybernetics-informed understanding of artist as a node 
in the network of exchange. Naturally, the decision about adopting this posture of 
indifference, about not having any expectations, is made by him, from a temporarily 
stabilized point of human agency. Still, we should perhaps read it as not just a rational 
decision, but also as bodily passivity, as letting oneself be-together-with-difference, 
with-technology. To cite Judith Butler again, ‘At stake here is the relation between the 
limits of ontology and epistemology, the link between the limits of what I might become 
and the limits of what I might risk knowing’.
20
 It is via points of temporary stabilisation 
between human, corporeal and technical agency that partial decisions are being made, 
connections between bodies are being established, aesthetic and political transformation 
is being achieved, and power is taking effect over different parts of ‘the network’ in a 
differential manner. There is therefore no guarantee that temporary outcomes of any 
such ongoing performative processes will be critical and transformative rather than just 
repetitive and conformist. But it is this possibility of emergence of such transformations 
and inventions, of making a difference that matters, that can turn this media project 
from the theatre of mere form to an ethico-political performance.
21
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which all come from the same photographic project, serve as interludes between 
different sections of the essay. Could we make sure they are all printed in the same size 
please (they’re quite detailed so, size-wise, the bigger the better ;)? Images 6-11 are part 
of a different project described in the essay – could they be all printed on one page in 
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